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5:335. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00335
Fedorenko (2014) examines “the relation-
ship between high-level language process-
ing and domain-general cognitive control,
with a focus on the brain systems that sup-
port these cognitive capacities (ital hers).”
She addresses two questions –“(i) when
(i.e., under what circumstances) the cog-
nitive control mechanisms get engaged
during language understanding; and (ii)
whether this engagement is necessary
for comprehension.” The first part of
Fedorenko’s paper presents data that she
says shows that (1) a neural “language
system” is stable within and across indi-
viduals, time, modality of presentation,
and language, and that (2) a “multiple-
demand (MD) system” that is activated by
tasks that contrast conditions that vary in
difficulty (an executive control system) is
anatomically separate from the language
system. This forms the backdrop to a
far-ranging discussion of the two ques-
tions in the second part of the paper. As
Fedorenko’s emphasis is on the contri-
bution of neural data to answering these
questions, my commentary will focus on
the relevance of the BOLD signal data
reported in Part 1 to them. I note at this
point that there are issues about the results
Fedorenko presents in Part 1 of her paper.
For instance, the within-subject stability of
the activations produced by Federonko’s
language localizer across time is docu-
mented in only four individuals—higher
than the industry standard of zero for the
number of participants tested twice for a
BOLD signal effect, but not a large num-
ber. However, my comments will accept
Fedorenko’s results and ask what they
show.
There are two functional neuroanatom-
ical findings reported in Section 1 of
Fedorenko’s paper that could bear on her
questions. The first is the finding that tasks
that activate the MD/executive system do
not activate the language system. I do not
think this result is relevant to the questions
posed. The crucial question is whether the
executive control system needs to activate
the comprehension functions localized by
Fedorenko’s language localizer when it
performs executive functions in the tasks
that Fedorenko used to localize it. As far
as I can see, it does not. Fedorenko local-
ized the high level language comprehen-
sion system by subtracting BOLD signal
associated with item recognition in lists
of non-words from that associated with
recognizing words in sentences (and, sep-
arately, by contrasting passive listening
to these stimuli), and localized the MD
system by varying complexity of arith-
metic processing and working memory
and with the Stroop task. The executive
system does not regulate operations that
perform high level language comprehen-
sion when it is involved in arithmetic pro-
cessing and Stroop (whether it does so
when it performs WM tasks is a matter of
debate; Caplan and Waters, 1999, 2013).
In Stroop, for example, the executive func-
tions needed in the interference condition
and not in the baseline conditions involve
lowering activation of the word derived
from print relative to that of the name
of the color in order to select a word
for production. The aspect of language
processing that is regulated is the word
production system (Roelofs, 2008), not
high level comprehension. The fact that
Stroop does not activate areas identified
by Federorenko’s language localizer there-
fore does not imply that executive func-
tions do not control language operations
in language comprehension tasks.
The second finding that might inform
the questions Fedorenko poses is the
reverse aspect of the non-overlap—that
Fedorenko’s language localizer does not
activate the MD system. However, this
direction of inference also fails. Power
aside, the absence of a difference in BOLD
signal in executive areas in the contrast of
an experimental and a baseline task does
not show that executive functions are not
needed in the experimental task; it only
shows that they are not used to a greater
extent in the experimental than in the
baseline task (Caplan, 2009). The absence
of an effect of the [sentence-nonword]
condition on MD areas is entirely con-
sistent with the MD/executive system
performing operations critical to high
level comprehension but performing the
same operations, or ones that require the
same degree of executive control, in the
baseline task.
Turning to more general issues, there
is an important gap in Fedorenko’s
discussion—she does not present a frame-
work for understanding the relation
between executive control operations and
the operations performed by domain-
specific processors in the performance
of a task. Further consideration of the
effects of the language localizer on BOLD
signal in MD areas shows why such a
model is needed. Fedorenko found that
the [nonword-sentence] contrast activated
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MD areas. We need a model of how exec-
utive controls operates in these two tasks
to understand why this happened. I will
outline a very simple model, and suggest
how it may account for this finding.
Work by many researchers (e.g., Meyer
and Kieras, 1997; Engle, 2002) has led to
the view that the executive system sets
and maintains task goals, activates the
components of the functional architec-
ture needed to perform a task, directs
attention to the stimuli that those compo-
nents operate on, and monitors response
selection for consistency with task goals.
With respect to these functions in the
conditions in Fedorenko’s localizer, set-
ting and maintaining task goals (to rec-
ognize probes in the memory version of
the localizer; unspecified goal in passive
listening), directing attention to the stim-
uli, and monitoring response-goal com-
patibility are required, and arguably the
same, in both conditions. The difference
in executive functioning in the two con-
ditions lies in the functional architecture
that the executive control system activates.
In the sentence condition, it presumably
activates operations that recognize words;
in the non-word list condition, it activates
operations that create representations of
non-words. It also activates mechanisms
that retain these percepts in STM. While
it is clear that sentence comprehension
mechanisms operate in the sentence con-
dition, it is not clear that they are activated
by the executive control system; they may
be automatically activated by attending to
the input in order to recognize words for
later recall. However, it is also possible
that the executive control system activates
both sentence comprehension operations
and those that recover sentence form from
meaning (Lombardi and Potter, 1992),
because this may be the easiest way to
meet task goals. Regardless, activating any
of these functional architectures in the
sentence condition is arguably easier than
activating the operations that identify and
retain non-words in the list condition, due
to the immense practice comprehenders
have with the first set and their almost
complete unfamiliarity with the second.
This would explain the finding of activa-
tion of MD areas by the non-word list
compared to the sentence conditions.
My point so far is that BOLD signal is
no different than behavioral variables in
one important respect—we need models
of the role of executive operations as well
as domain-specific operations in perform-
ing all conditions of the tasks used in an
experiment to interpret BOLD signal in
MD and language areas in a contrast of
two conditions. Non-overlap or reversed
effects of conditionsmay be expected given
certain models of the role of executive con-
trol in regulating domain-specific opera-
tions in the tasks used in some studies.
A second point, with which I will con-
clude, pertains to the well-recognized and
oft cited temporal (in)sensitivity of BOLD
signal.
BOLD signal has a resolution of several
seconds. Some executive control opera-
tions that differ between conditions in
fMRI studies likely take place for a small
fraction of the time over which neural
activity affects BOLD signal in a condi-
tion. For example, task-switching studies
suggest that, if conditions are blocked,
activating the functional architecture
needed in a condition (the executive
function that I suggested differed in the
two conditions in Fedorenko’s language
localizer) might be performed once at the
outset of a block of trials in that condition
(Monsell, 2003), leading to a very small
contribution of activity of the executive
control system on BOLD signal in a con-
dition. Non-activation of a brain area in a
contrast of two conditions may thus result
from the insensitivity of BOLD signal to
transient cognitive operations. To capture
the neural correlates of these short-lived
operations requires measuring neural
activity on the time scale at which they
apply, in the areas where they apply. This
requires measures such as MR-constrained
MEG/EEG signal. When we have used this
measure, we have consistently found activ-
ity in MD areas of the brain that interacts
with activity in language areas of the brain
during on-line sentence comprehension
(unpublished data). The interpretive chal-
lenge in our studies has been the extent
and the extensive pattern of interactions
of EEG/MEG activity seen during on-line
comprehension.
To conclude, Fedorenko has taken on
the great challenge of using neural data to
resolve, or at least influence the answer to,
one of the most debated questions in cog-
nitive science and psycholinguistics: how
control operations interact with domain-
specific operations in higher level language
comprehension. I suggest that this effort
requires consideration of cognitive models
at a least a moderate grain size. It may also
require use of measures of neural activ-
ity that have significantly better temporal
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